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I. INTRODUCTION
I am deeply honored to be invited to deliver this prestigious annual
lecture, and very grateful for your presence here today.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant
against a sitting head of state for crimes against an ethnic minority
that, at least prima facie, the court characterizes as genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. In defiance, President Omar Al
Bashir of Sudan has expelled humanitarian aid organizations, gotten
himself "re-elected", and continues to detain and torture Sudanese
human rights activists on the pretext of their supposed cooperation
with the ICC. President Al Bashir also threatens to refuse his
country's consent for other actions of the international community
designed to avoid crises in Darfur, Southern Sudan, and the oil-rich
area of Abyei. In some quarters, the action of the ICC is seen as an
example of the pursuit of justice at all costs and one that threatens to
provoke further and more serious human rights violations than it
attempts to resolve. Fortunately, the most dire predictions about the
effect of the arrest warrant did not materialize, but the event
illustrates the potential for a perceived conflict between two
legitimate values and interests of the international community:
accountability for international crimes and the prevention of similar,
new abuses in an ongoing conflict.
Only a few years before the indictment of President Al Bashir, a
similar debate seemed to call into question the idea of a permanent
international court designed to provide justice to victims of human
rights abuse when Joseph Kony demanded that the warrant for his
arrest and that of other leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army be
quashed as a condition for his participation in peace talks to bring the
conflict in Northern Uganda to an end. Well-meaning conflict
f

Visiting Professor, Washington College of Law, The American University. The
author acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Ms. Kavita Kapur, JD
candidate, 2011.

365

366

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 40

resolution specialists accused the ICC and its prosecutor of making
peace impossible by refusing to accommodate Kony's demands. In
Northern Uganda, the issue was characterized-in an oversimplification-as one of "Peace versus Justice." In Darfur, since
there were no active peace talks at the time of the arrest warrant, the
conflict-if any-was between Justice and Prevention. In both cases,
however, the dilemmas are closely related, and they force us to
reckon with whether and how we can pursue both justice and peace,
and justice and prevention, when those values seem to be at odds
with each other.
Of course, stating that justice, peace, and prevention are all equally
valuable; that they are not in contradiction with each other; and that
they are mutually reinforcing does not solve the problem. We need
to find ways to honor all three in practice, not just as a matter of lofty
principles. For that, we probably need to understand prevention in all
its dimensions. We also need to consider peace as something beyond
the immediate silencing of the guns and, particularly, what terms will
ensure a lasting peace, rather than simply a lull in fighting.
Moreover, we also need to approach justice with a comprehensive,
balanced approach, one that includes, but is not limited to,
punishment of those bearing the highest responsibility for the most
serious crimes.
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The set of mechanisms and practices that over the last quarter
century have been used in widely different cultures to confront
legacies of mass atrocities can offer solutions to the dilemmas of
justice, peace, and prevention. Those practices have come to be
designated under the label of "transitional justice," and their
advantage lies in the fact that they consist of truly universal
principles that must be applied in each case according to contextual
and cultural conditions. This adaptation to circumstances does not
diminish the universality of the values and objectives that the
practices aim to realize; on the contrary, it enriches each experiment
with the lessons learned from other applications and experiences.
"Transitional justice" alludes to the need to confront mass atrocities
of the recent past while realizing the values of truth, justice,
reparations for victims, and institutional reform. Truth must be
sought and disclosed in an official way so that there can be no denial
of the atrocities committed and so that the circumstances of each
violation, and the fate and whereabouts of each victim, can be
established through the best evidence available. Justice consists first
and foremost of investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those
abuses that constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, and
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targeting those most responsible for them. Reparations should
consist of both moral gestures and monetary compensation that
recognizes the plight of victims and their families and restores to
them their worth as first-class citizens in the society that has recently
allowed their victimization. State institutions that have been the
vehicle for the perpetration of atrocities must be thoroughly reformed
so that in the future, no leaders can abuse their authority in order to
commit human rights violations. Each of these avenues must be
pursued in good faith and to the best of the State's abilities. They
should not be conditioned on each other because inability to make
any progress in one of them does not relieve the State from its
responsibility to pursue the other three. On the other hand, it is of
course advisable to pursue all four in a balanced, comprehensive,
"holistic" way.
The adjective "transitional" is not meant to qualify the value of
justice to be sought, but rather alludes to the special obstacles to the
realization of justice that characterize transitions from dictatorship to
democracy or from justice to peace.
Transitional justice is
emphatically not some sort of "justice light." It is also not meant to
offer a way out of, or be a substitute for, criminal prosecution of the
main perpetrators but to supplement their indispensable punishment
with other non-judicial measures that can offer a more
comprehensive redress to the whole universe of mass atrocities.
Undoubtedly, criminal prosecution will always be the most difficult
of the tasks of transitional justice, not only because of the pressures
in favor of impunity but also because it will have to be conducted
with the most rigorous respect for the principles of fair trial and due
process of law, and often in a context where the State's judiciary has
been devastated by the conflict or by the dictatorship's actions. And
yet, if transitional justice is to be meaningful, it must include at its
core the determination to uphold the principle that some crimes are so
egregious that they cannot be left unpunished.
Significantly, the experiences of the last twenty-five years have
yielded not only a series of "best practices" but have also resulted in
a series of "emerging norms" in international law with respect to
what states owe to the victims-individual and collective-of mass
atrocities. Indeed, "emerging" might not be the best way to
characterize these norms because their existence and binding nature
are now very widely recognized. In addition, they are not actually
new norms but rather authoritative interpretations of existing human
rights standards as applied to the realities of transitions. Providing
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even a few examples of this evolution in the international law of
human rights would exceed the limits of this presentation.' These
precedents have been the source of comprehensive United Nations
reports that both take stock of normative evolution and advance
standards with a view to future adoption.2 Contemporaneously with
these societal practices in transitional states, the international
community decided in the 1990s to incorporate accountability for
grave crimes into the arsenal of measures available in the pursuit of
peace and security among nations. The creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994 borrowed a page
from the efforts in newly democratic societies to settle scores with
perpetrators of mass atrocities. They were followed in later years by
international support for "mixed" courts (applying domestic law with
a combination of local and international judges and court personnel)
in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Cambodia, and Lebanon. The United
Nations has recognized that these principles are binding not only on
1.

2.

Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras is the early decision establishing obligations to
confront crimes against humanity, in that case, disappearances. Veldsquez-Rodriguez
v. Honduras, Merits and Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988),
availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b 11 12d.htm. It was followed by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Reports Nos. 28 and 29 dealing
with impunity laws. Herrera v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262,
10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.LN/II.83, doc.
14 (1992-1993), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/92eng/Argentina
10.147.htm; Mendoze v. Uraguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372,
10.373, 10.374, 10.375, Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1992-1993),
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/92eng(Uruguay10.029.htm.
at
available
Following these was a long list of decisions going in the same direction. See, e.g.,
Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App. Nos. 23052/04, 24018/04, HUDOC (Jan. 17, 2006),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=24018/04&sessionid=68682247&skin=hudoc-en (discussing prosecution for
Communist atrocities in the late 1940s).
Rep. on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and
U.N.
Doc.
1997,
Oct. 2,
Sess.,
of Minorities, 49th
Protection
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997) (by Louis Joinet), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.sub.2.1997.20.Rev. 1.
En; Rep. of the Indep. Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity,
Comm'n on Human Rights, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.l (Feb. 8,
2005) (by Diane Orentlicher), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu
/principles.html. Together, these reports, both issued within a decade, are a powerful
illustration of the rapid evolution of international law in this area, a phenomenon that
has been called a "justice cascade." Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice
Cascade: The Evolution and Impact ofForeignHuman Rights Trials in latin America,
2 Chi J. Int'1 L. 1, 4 (2001).
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states but also on the organization itself as it tries to intervene in
conflicts while upholding international law.3
The tipping point in this evolution is the 1998 Statute of Rome for
the Creation of an International Criminal Court. First, the ICC is a
permanent instrument for the realization of justice where the
domestic jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to honor these
obligations. Second, the Rome Statute clarifies and makes certain
what is meant by notions like "crimes against humanity," which have
been with us at least since Nuremberg but that lacked certainty as to
their contours, primarily because their source was custom and not
treaty. Finally, the Rome Statute is a tipping point because more than
110 state parties and more than 160 signatories have pledged to
cooperate with each other and with the ICC in breaking the cycle of
impunity for international crimes. In an important way, it can be said
that the effect of this evolution is to create a new paradigm in the
manner in which conflicts of interest to the international community
are to be resolved. If those conflicts involve genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity (and unfortunately they almost
invariably do), the solution must reckon not only with the need to
silence the guns but also to offer avenues of justice to the victims.
III. PEACE AND JUSTICE
Perhaps the first step is to recognize when a dilemma exists. On
occasions, the dilemmas are artificially invoked by those who simply
want to impose impunity.' Frequently, however, the dilemma is very
real, especially when the fighting and its accompanying brutality are
still ongoing. In those situations, a firm insistence on accountability
through the punishment of individuals who violate human rights
3.

4.

U.N. Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, UN. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?
OpenElement. This report provides that States have an obligation to investigate,
prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of such atrocities; that amnesties are contrary to
international law; and that international tribunals can be used when the concerned
state is not able or willing to carry out its obligations. Id. In 1999, the SecretaryGeneral adopted Guidelines for UN Mediators (revised and reaffirmed in 2005),
which stated that the UN would not support peace arrangements that by their terms
violate international law. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General
Comments on Guidelines Given to Envoys SG/SM/7257 (Dec. 10, 1999).
For example, in the early and mid-80s in Latin America, a favorite argument of proimpunity actors was to say that justice demands, however legitimate they might be,
would have the effect of destabilizing fledgling democratic regimes or of delaying the
return to democracy in neighboring countries.
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complicates a negotiation process meant to end the conflict that is the
enabling environment for human rights abuses.' Recognition of the
dilemma should not automatically lead to the conclusion that peace
Instead, the very real
trumps justice even in those cases.
seen
in a constructive light:
complication that justice presents must be
it may make peace more difficult, but it also forces all participants in
the peace process to strive for better deals rather than acquiesce to the
demands of the perpetrators. Instead of settling for that easy peace,
which leaves behind open wounds that can later cause renewed
fighting, the obligation to reckon with justice can lead to a
substantive peace that has a better chance of being durable.
It is also not always the case that an insistence on justice will make
peace impossible. Quite the contrary, it is possible that the stigma
and political isolation brought about by prosecution can act to
separate those actors who, in addition to being. international
criminals, are also the real spoilers of any serious agreement. The
refusal to lift ICTY arrest warrants against Karadzic and Mladic not
only did not impede the Dayton talks: it actually made it possible to
reach an agreement to end the wars in the Former Yugoslavia.
Conversely, a bad agreement can lead to further fighting and further
atrocities, as was the case with the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement on
the conflict in Sierra Leone. It included a blanket amnesty for
perpetrators of atrocious crimes, and six months later, those same
signers of the peace accord were fighting again, and again
committing crimes by recruiting children and cutting off limbs of
children, women, and innocent civilians.' Denial of justice in that
accord was not only an insult added to the many injuries suffered by
innocent Sierra Leoneans it was also the wrong way to pursue peace,
as it could only result in emboldening and encouraging the enemies
of peace. Like in the Balkans, lasting peace in Liberia was obtained
only after President Charles Taylor, a notorious perpetrator of
atrocities in his own country and a prime instigator of the conflict in
Sierra Leone, was sidelined and eventually forced out of office after
being indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

5.

Juan E. Mdndez, Peace, Justice and Prevention: Dilemmas and False Dilemmas, in
DEALING WITH THE PAST AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CREATING CONDITIONS FOR

PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 15 (M6 Bleeker, ed., 2006), available

6.

http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/16374/original/Dealingwith-the
at
past andtransitionaljustice.pdf.
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, art. IX, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierraleone.org/lomeaccord.html.
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The key to solving the dilemma is to recognize that peace and
justice are not simply policy objectives; they are also fundamental
human values that should be fulfilled in their own right and for their
own worth. It follows that it is a mistake to consider either peace or
justice as an instrument to achieve the other. In this sense,
prosecutions often have the effect of pushing reluctant parties to the
bargaining table, perhaps with the belief that they can obtain amnesty
through peace negotiations. All observers agree that that is exactly
what prompted Joseph Kony to join the Juba talks, which, even if
they ultimately did not result in peace in Northern Uganda, have
certainly achieved a large measure of improvement in the situation.
Instead, if the threat of arrest and prosecution is turned on and off to
please a party to the conflict, such actions will only undermine the
independence and impartiality of the courts and will encourage
blackmailers to hold on for impunity.
It is not necessarily true that even a bad peace agreement will
automatically create the conditions for justice down the road. A
myopic process that pursues peace at all costs and sacrifices
accountability to peace, in fact, creates obstacles for redress for the
victims and communities who have suffered systematic atrocities. In
this sense, it is always advisable to build a process by which the
victims of atrocities are heard in the context of the peace process so
that they play a role in shaping the accord that will affect them and
their community and thereby acquire some stake in making the
agreement work. At Juba, parallel proceedings allowed the affected
communities precisely such a role, and it resulted in a richer and
more accurate understanding of their priorities and wishes. Kony
manipulated the eagerness of the international community to appease
criminals and repeatedly took advantage of the peace talks to regroup
and rearm his forces. When he failed to obtain assurances of
impunity, he ultimately sabotaged the process and went back to
fighting and terrorizing the civilian population in neighboring
countries, amply demonstrating that he was never serious about
peace, which in turn greatly diminished his ability to gather support
among his own people of Northern Uganda.
Like Kony, other perpetrators of mass atrocities will always
demand amnesty, though not necessarily as a precondition for talks.
More often, amnesty will be proposed as part of the final settlement,
that is to say, as part of the "package" of measures that will put an
end to the fighting. In those cases, proposals for blanket amnesties
will be presented as necessary for "national reconciliation." Such
demands are a form of blackmail because the perpetrator demands to
be allowed to get away with having committed crimes, or else he will
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continue to commit them. In those situations, the choice between
peace and justice is artificial: if you choose one, you may get neither.
Blanket amnesties are illegal in international law because they cover
international crimes and because they are unconditional. They are a
coercive means of compelling victims to reconcile with perpetrators,
while denying those victims their internationally-required right to a
remedy for the abuses they have suffered. They force the victims
into a false "reconciliation" without allowing them the means by
which to seek and obtain the basic elements of a genuine
reconciliation. Parties that seek a blanket amnesty as a condition to
peace are unlikely to be genuinely and seriously concerned with
peace or in a position to guarantee it if agreed to.
This is not to say that all amnesties are contrary to international
law. In fact, Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions-a
separate instrument approved in 1977 to apply specifically to
conflicts not of an international character-contains a clause by
which, at the end of hostilities, parties "shall endeavor" to grant each
other a broad and generous amnesty. Numerous authorities clarify
that such a clause is meant to immunize from prosecution those who
have risen up in arms against the State, thereby committing the
domestic crime of sedition, rebellion, or treason. It is for those
offenses that amnesty is prescribed in Protocol II as a condition for
the rebels to give up the fight and join the democratic political
process. Clearly, it does not and should not benefit those in either
camp that have fought their war in violation of fundamental
principles of the laws of war. Nevertheless, it is amply evident that a
limited amnesty is not only permissible but is also to be encouraged
and included in peace processes.
Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially
for those bearing the highest responsibility for them, is not
permissible, and, as seen above, it is also a bad idea. Should the
peace agreement then contain specific norms delineating how and
when those perpetrators will be brought to justice? That, of course, is
a more difficult question because you cannot expect a signer of a
peace accord to agree to a clause that will lead him straight to prison.
In the Bonn Agreement of 2002, to bring peace between factions in
Afghanistan after the temporary defeat of the Taliban, amnesty was
discussed, and, since it was acknowledged that it would be contrary
to international law, the final agreement was silent on the matter.
Years later, this silence lent itself to widely differing interpretations:
civil society organizations insisted on investigations and eventual
prosecutions, while militia leaders (by then with seats in the
legislative body) felt that the amnesty was implied in the accord.
Impunity for the abuses of all factions reigns today in Afghanistan,
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although certainly not all the blame for it can be attributed to a faulty
peace accord.
Silence may be better than an explicit amnesty in violation of
international law, but, as far as possible, peace accords should leave
no doubt as to their intention regarding impunity and accountability.
Some argue for "sequencing," meaning that an accord can specify
that the actual investigation, prosecution, and criminal trials will take
place at a later date or only after some other mileposts have been
achieved. In principle, there is nothing wrong with that approach, as
long as it may seem necessary to obtain peace and particularly
because it brings up justice as an essential objective of the
negotiations. It should be recognized, however, that sequencing
requires victims to postpone their legitimate demands in a way that
may not be required of other stakeholders. This inherent inequality,
therefore, must be balanced with strong assurances and by other,
more immediate and tangible results for the victims. In any event,
sequencing in the domestic jurisdiction is almost a natural occurrence
since by and large the national courts will not readily be equipped to
deal with complex criminal prosecutions with necessary guarantees
of fair trial and due process. In fact, even where courts are more or
less in good shape at the end of the conflict, it is better to allow a
truth-telling process to compile and organize the evidence that will
make it easier to later establish prosecutorial priorities and ensure an
orderly and stable program of trials to be held within a reasonable
time frame.
If sequencing in the domestic jurisdiction is fraught with
complications but is otherwise a legitimate way to approach our
dilemma, it is much more problematic if the measure of justice to be
accomplished relies primarily, if not exclusively, on the ICC. It is
already very difficult to ensure compliance with ICC warrants and
other orders, and a political decision to suspend investigations and
judicial actions will mostly undermine the credibility of the ICC as an
independent and impartial body and will tend to encourage
defendants and potential defendants to challenge the ICC's
jurisdiction through political decisions arrived at in negotiations.
There are at least three ways in which the Rome Statute contemplates
suspension of ICC activities, but each one of them should be
considered carefully and as a last resort rather than as an expedient
way to get rid of a problem.' It must be borne in mind that, in an
7.

Article 16 allows the Security Council to suspend an investigation or prosecution
through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for one year and
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international context, a suspension may well in practice become
definitive and final, given the practical difficulties of resuming
activities after a long pause.
At the very least, clauses in peace agreements that limit or
condition access to justice by the victims should never be adopted
without meaningful consultation with all stakeholders and
particularly with the victims. Indeed, as stated above, victims and
their communities should have a say on all aspects of the peace
process and on the substantive agreements being considered; but their
participation is especially essential in all matters affecting impunity
and accountability since it affects their fundamental right to see
justice done. In this manner, the pursuit of justice allows victims to
become players in a peace process that typically excludes them,
focusing instead only on the parties to the conflict. Needless to say,
the parties to the conflict will almost invariably have more of an
interest in impunity than in justice. The inclusion of victims in a
peace process through consultations or parallel discussions does not
detract from the fundamental role that mediators and warring parties
must have. In fact, it leads to a much more inclusive and sustainable
peace precisely because it more assuredly achieves a pact that is
consistent with international law.
IV. PREVENTION

-

Justice serves not only the retroactive purposes of accountability
for acts committed but may also contribute to the prevention of future
atrocities. That is why most international instruments, starting with
the Genocide Convention of 1948,8 assume that we prevent future
crimes by punishing those that have already taken place. According
to the Rome Statute, a central object and purpose of the International
Criminal Court is to contribute to the prevention of crimes of concern
to the international community.9 There is, of course, scant empirical

8.
9.

also allows that resolution to be renewed. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art. 16, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1,
2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/RomeStatute English.pdf [hereinafter "Rome Statute"].
Article 19 provides that a State with domestic jurisdiction over a case may challenge
the admissibility of a case to the ICC on the grounds that it is willing and able to
afford justice. Rome Statute, art. 19(2)(b). Article 53 provides that the Prosecutor
may make the decision to suspend activities "in the interests of justice," among other
considerations. Rome Statute, art. 53(1)(c), (2)(c).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
Rome Statute, Preamble.
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evidence to show for this assumption, and yet the idea still carries
considerable weight. If the deterrent effect of punishment is hard to
show in the domestic jurisdiction and in relation to common crime, it
is even harder when it comes to mass atrocities. The problem is
compounded when we try to apply empirical evidence to the effect of
international criminal justice since the latter is so recent in practice,
and there are so few cases to analyze for their long term effects
beyond the justice done in the relevant episode.
Nevertheless, one can point to some anecdotal evidence of such a
deterrent effect of international justice and perhaps even stronger
evidence that pursuing justice for mass atrocity in the domestic scene
yields benefits in the stability and quality of the democracy installed
to replace dictatorship and conflict. " Prevention, however, is a
complex and dynamic process that is never achieved through justice
alone, much less once and for all through prosecution and
punishment of some perpetrators. It is therefore important to think
under what conditions justice can have a preventive effect."
In the first place, the preventive and deterrent effect of justice is
greatly enhanced if it is integrated into a more comprehensive plan of
prevention of mass atrocities. In my role as Special Advisor to the
UN Secretary-General on Prevention of Genocide (which I exercised
between 2004 and 2007), I learned that effective prevention depends
on acting simultaneously and with adaptability to circumstances in
four areas: protection of populations at risk, humanitarian assistance
to them, pursuit of peace on the underlying conflict, and justice and
accountability for the crimes already committed. A second condition
of effectiveness in prevention through justice is to pursue justice
under its own rules and its legitimizing principles. In other words,
justice will not deter future violations if it is perceived as an exercise
in political manipulation, scapegoating, or show trials. Central to this
goal is the preservation of the integrity, independence, and
impartiality of the judicial organs. They should be allowed to do
their work free of interference and actively supported in their
10.

11.

See also Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Do Human Rights Trials Make a
Difference?, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 35 (Aug. 2007)
("[T]rials deter future human rights violations by increasing the perception of the
possibility of costs of repression for individual state officials."), available at
http://pfdc.pgr.mpf.gov.br/atuacao-e-conteudos-de-apoio/publicacoes/direito-amemoria-e-a-verdade/Artigo KathrynSikkink.pdf.
Juan E. Mendez, Justice and Prevention (Aug. 2010) (presented to the Kampala
Review Conference of the Assembly of State Parties of the ICC, June 2010) (on file
with author).
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decisions and orders. Third, prosecutions in the international arena
will have a better chance to succeed in prevention if they are
accompanied by efforts in the domestic jurisdiction under the
principle of complementarity, not in competition over jurisdiction but
in a harmonious division of labor. Fourth, the preventive effect of
justice should not be considered only in relation to successful
prosecutions and eventual penalties effectively imposed. Prevention
can happen by the mere availabilityof the justice system in place, by
the announcement of initial investigations or analysis of a situation,
and even by reason of the entry into force of the Rome Statute for the
country in question. Finally, it should be realized that even in the
best of circumstances, prosecutions will proceed only with regard to a
small number of the universe of cases and potential defendants. This
is true of domestic as well as international prosecutions, even when
both are combined. For that reason, it will be necessary to
complement prosecutions with comprehensive and balanced
initiatives of a non-judicial character that can reach a broader
coverage of the complex and massive atrocities.
It follows that the application of transitional justice mechanisms, in
consultation with, and with full participation of, all stakeholders, will
enhance the possibility that the indispensable criminal prosecutions
will have a lasting, preventive effect over future violations.
A. Prosecutions
The presence of a justice mechanism in the domestic jurisdiction
can serve to discourage the commission of atrocities. Human rights
violations are enabled by a perception on the part of the perpetrators
that they are unlikely to be held accountable for their actions. The
existence of a justice mechanism that takes these violations seriously
The opposite is clearly documentable:
disrupts this calculus.
potential perpetrators who are biding their time go into a frenzy of
abuses as soon as they receive a clear signal that they will not be
investigated.
The commission of human rights abuses is often enabled by an
environment of exception: a situation of conflict or emergency. An
established and predictable set of laws and a system of justice
provide regularity and normalcy even in the midst of the exceptional
situation. The pursuit of accountability by strong and independent
institutions creates a framework for justice, the existence of which
informs potential perpetrators that even though there may be a
conflict or some other emergency, justice will still be served even in
extreme circumstances.
On the other hand, the threat of prosecution will be taken less
seriously by the perpetrators if they figure out that it is wielded
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against them only for the purpose of persuading them to negotiate.
Conspiring against the preventive effect of justice will be the
perception of prolonged and ineffective bureaucratic inquiries with
no prospects of real progress, and particularly of a judicial system
that does not treat all persons equally.
The courts must be open and accessible to all sectors of society,
including the most vulnerable. Even those accused of committing
atrocities should be afforded legal protection in order to entrench a
culture of fairness by justice institutions. The accused must be
effectively defended against the charges brought against them by
counsel of their own choosing and be otherwise assured of the
presumption of innocence and all other attributes of a fair trial.
Institutions must build credibility and must therefore be willing to
take on the most difficult issues in a society, including especially the
investigation, prosecution, and eventual punishment of perpetrators
of recent mass atrocities.
B. Truth-Telling
The opportunity to build a record of what happened within a given
society is integral to empowering marginalized groups and creating a
sense of shared history amongst all members of the community. By
empowering those groups that are otherwise disenfranchised, truthtelling provides them with an increased sense of social inclusion that
minimizes other tensions. The effectiveness of a specific truth
commission or commission of inquiry depends on many factors: the
composition of its membership, the clarity of its mandate, the
openness and transparency of its proceedings, the degree to which it
affords the victims a forum to be heard, and the guarantees of due
process it gives to persons identified as perpetrators. Fundamentally,
its success depends on the quality, accuracy, and credibility of the
report it produces and its impact on the society's awareness of the
legacy of abuses it must confront.
C. Reparations
In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted GA Res.
60/147,12 which laid out basic principles on reparations to victims of
gross human rights violations originally proposed by Special
Rapporteurs Theo van Boven and M. Cherif Bassiouni.

12.

G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec.
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/res60-147.html.

16, 2005), available at
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Reparations must be seen as an act of justice as well as a symbolic
act of atonement, rather than an attempt to restore the status quo ante.
Moreover, reparations are not paid by an individual to another but
rather by the State held accountable for the past abuse to the
community as a whole, even in instances where the beneficiaries may
in fact be certain identifiable persons. The offer of reparations
represents recognition by the government and a coming to terms with
the history that is itself a promise not to repeat.
D. InstitutionalReform
The vetting component of transitional justice consists of a process
by which officials known to have used their institutions as vehicles
for human rights violations are prevented from continuing to serve in
newly democratized police, military, or other forces and State
institutions.
It promotes the prevention of crimes by clearly
demonstrating that positions of authority or prestige cannot be
reached through the commission of human rights abuses. Creating
strong and fair institutions under citizen control and with accountable
leaders is a way of reinforcing civic trust and promoting the use of
non-violent, institutional processes to resolve disputes and conflicts.
E. Reconciliation
Reconciliation is ordinarily not a fifth mechanism of transitional
justice. Rather, when well understood, it is the objective and guiding
principle of the whole enterprise of transitional justice. It especially
should not be conceived of as an excuse to circumvent the obligation
to provide for justice, truth, reparations, and institutional reform on
the pretext that the society has to reconcile itself. In this sense, it is
important to distinguish the concept of reconciliation as the ultimate
resolution of the violent aspect of a conflict between warring factions
from the discredited effort to impose a false reconciliation between
perpetrator and victim without any effort on the part of the former
and the whole burden placed on the latter.
An exception to this is when the atrocities have had a clear ethnic,
religious, or racial dimension because, in that case, the abuses are
likely to be blamed not so much on the perpetrators but on the
communities they claimed to represent. If so, the lack of an effort to
distinguish between the guilty and their communities could lead in
the future to revenge and renewed conflict, as descendants of the
abusers are blamed for what their ancestors did to members of other
communities. In places like Darfur, it will be important not only to
have justice, truth, reparations, and institutional reform but also to
complement them with inter-communal conversations between the
Fur, Masaalit, Zhagawa and the leaders of the so-called Arab tribes

2011]1

Transitional Justice, Peace, and Prevention

379

over issues like restoration of property, return to villages, water,
passage, grazing rights for cattle, and ultimately the means to share
equitably in political power in the region.
F. Rise ofInternationalCriminalJustice
The proliferation of international tribunals to serve justice for
atrocities serves an important preventative role by filling a gap in
accountability that exists when the territorial state is unable or
unwilling to prosecute international crimes. With many of the worst
human rights violations taking place in countries and regions ravaged
with other forms of instability, perpetrators of human rights abuses
had little reason to expect that they would be held to account for their
actions. To the extent that the promise of impunity enables the
commission of atrocities, a more complete system of accountability
serves to deter the commission of international crimes, even if we are
still witnessing the birth and infancy, not the maturity, of the system
of international criminal justice.
The rise of the internationalized courts, of mixed or hybrid courts,
the ICC in particular, and the application by some domestic courts of
universal jurisdiction helps to build a more complete system of
accountability wherein perpetrators can be on notice that they will
almost certainly be held to account for the atrocities they commit. In
particular, the emergence of the ICC represents the potential for the
international community, with its network of inter-governmental and
civil society organizations, and state authorities to give voice to the
experiences of many victims, whose stories may previously have
gone untold in a national system if they came from a minority race or
religion or were otherwise marginalized in a particular society.
The promotion of domestic capacity by international tribunals
through "legacy" initiatives, the outreach efforts of hybrid courts, and
the "positive complementarity" applied by the ICC all promote a
sense of local ownership and participation in justice." As
communities feel more connected to processes of justice, this helps to
entrench a recognition of injustice amongst members of the society,
which in turn results in a normative understanding that atrocious acts
13.

See Paul van Zyl, The Challenge of CriminalJustice: Lessons Learnedfrom
International,Hybrid andDomestic Trials,in DEALING WITH THE PAST AND
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CREATING CONDITIONS FOR PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 23 (M6 Bleeker, ed., 2006), available at

http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/16374/
original/Dealing_with the past and transitionaljustice.pdf.
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should not be committed against others. The closer relationship
between communities and criminal proceedings may also foster
prevention by creating a society of informed witnesses.
If
community members feel connected to judicial processes, they may
be more inclined to engage in community policing and monitoring of
activities within their environment. The potential of a country full of
witnesses, who could report these acts to national or international
authorities, would likely be another deterrent to the commission of
international crimes.
I have had the privilege to serve as Special Adviser to the
Prosecutor of the ICC on Crime Prevention, and in that capacity I
have documented numerous circumstances that indicate an effective
role of justice initiatives in the prevention of atrocities.
* Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Representative of the
Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict, testified
before the ICC in early 2010 at the trial against Thomas
Lubanga. In addition to describing the need for a legal
framework that effectively protects vulnerable children,
Coomaraswamy highlighted that the decision by the ICC to
prosecute the conscription of child soldiers had led several
armed groups worldwide to approach the UN in hopes of
negotiating the release of child soldiers.14
She
acknowledged that "[t]he Lubanga trial represents a crucial
precedent in the fight against impunity and will have a
decisive deterrent effect against perpetrators of such
crimes."
* Human Rights Watch (HRW) also confirmed that the
prosecutions in the Democratic Republic of Congo are
having a preventive effect.
HRW found that ICC
prosecutions have resulted in an increased awareness of
what constitutes criminal behavior, noting as an example
the demobilization of child soldiers by a Central African
Republic rebel commander after learning about the ICC's
prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for conscription of
child soldiers.
* According to Samantha Power, the late Alison Des Forges
of Human Rights Watch documented this most ably with
respect to the Rwandan genocide, showing how

14.

The Office of the Prosecutor, Weekly Briefing: 22 December 2009 - 11 January2010,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C44612E2-

6A90-4389-A2DD-AEA3 1EAAA2E4/281444/OTPWBENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2011).
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every day-every single hour of every day-individuals
who have never killed before are deciding how far they
are going to go. Often, as they make those decisions,
they are looking left, and looking right, and gauging
likely consequences. Most possess normal moral
compasses before they strike. One does not need to
make extravagant claims for the International Criminal
Court to note that the existence of a court that proves its
staying power and its preparedness to make arrests
would influence a first-time war criminal's behavior."
*

In November 2004 in Cote d'Ivoire, the head of the national
radio and television system was replaced at a time of
heightened tensions between ethnic communities, with
armed militias in the countryside and gangs of "Young
Patriots" menacingly roving the streets of Abidjan. The
newly appointed head unleashed a barrage of hate speech
through the air waves that was eerily reminiscent of the
days preceding the Rwandan genocide. SG Kofi Annan and
the Security Council issued stem warnings. In my capacity
as Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, I issued
a statement to the effect that instigation to commit genocide
is a crime under the Rome Statute and, since Cote d'Ivoire
had accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC, those responsible
for hate speech that amounted to instigation could see
themselves brought to The Hague to answer for their
actions. We later learned that that prospect was actively
considered by the legal advisors to the government, and the
hate speech messages subsided after a hectic and tense
weekend.

IV. CONCLUSION
Transitional justice may be critical to ensuring peace and
advancing prevention in relation to mass human rights violations.
But, as I have recognized above, neither peace nor prevention can
happen through justice alone. Prevention requires coordinated,
15.

Samantha Power, Stopping Genocide and Securing "Justice": Learning by Doing, 69
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simultaneous, dynamic action in four different areas: protection,
relief, accountability, and peace talks to solve the underlying conflict.
None of these actions can take primacy over the others, so justice
alone will be insufficient to prevent crimes. Nonetheless, justice
serves an important role in the process of transition and cannot be
seen as subordinate, or even in opposition, to other efforts to promote
peace.

